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CRIMINAL MALPRACTICE: THRESHOLD
BARRIERS TO RECOVERY AGAINST
NEGLIGENT CRIMINAL
COUNSEL
In the past decade the number of malpractice suits brought against
attorneys by their former clients increased dramatically.I Most of these
cases were civil malpractice actions, involving claims that arose out of
an attorney's handling of a civil matter.2 Some suits, however, were
actions for criminal malpractice-legal malpractice in the course of
representing a criminal defendant.3 Although criminal malpractice
suits are relatively uncommon, they are becoming increasingly attrac-
tive to convicted criminal defendants. 4
Civil and criminal malpractice actions involve many of the same
issues, and courts generally treat them in a similar manner. The basic
1. See R. MALLEN & V. LEVIT, LEGAL MALPRACTICE § 6 (1977).
2. State malpractice claims may sound in tort or contract, and the analysis is similar in
either situation. See R. MALLEN & V. LEVIT, supra note 1, § 71. Several convicted criminal
defendants also have brought actions against their attorneys under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976). See,
e.g., Smith v. Clapp, 436 F.2d 590 (3d Cir. 1970). These actions are outside the scope of this
comment, which deals only with malpractice actions based on state law.
3. Kaus & Mallen, The Misguiding Hand of Counsel-Re/ections on "Criminal Mapractice,"
21 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1191, 1191 n.2 (1974).
4. Two-thirds of the reported cases have been decided since 1970. See Ferri v. Ackerman,
444 U.S. 193 (1979); Jackson v. Salon, 614 F.2d 15 (1st Cir. 1980); Myers v. Butler, 556 F.2d 398
(8th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 956 (1977); Walker v. Kruse, 484 F.2d 802 (7th Cir. 1973); Sullens
v. Carroll, 446 F.2d 1392 (5th Cir. 1971); Hunt v. Bittman, 482 F. Supp. 1017 (D.D.C. 1980);
Tasby v. Peek, 396 F. Supp. 952 (W.D. Ark. 1975); Sanchez v. Murphy, 385 F. Supp. 1362 (D.
Nev. 1974); Malloy v. Sullivan, 387 So. 2d 169 (Ala. 1980); Bradshaw v. Pardee, Civ. No. 15444
(Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 13, 1978); Martin v. Hall, 20 Cal. App. 3d 414, 97 Cal. Rptr. 730 (1971);
Spring v. Constantino, 168 Conn. 563, 362 A.2d 871 (1975); Henzel v. Fink, 340 So. 2d 1926 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1976); Hughes v. Malone, 146 Ga. App. 341, 247 S.E.2d 107 (1978); Talley v.
Yonan, 72 Ill. App. 3d 851, 391 N.E.2d 79 (1979); Ochoa v. Maloney, 69 Ill. App. 3d 689, 387
N.E.2d 852 (1979); Geddie v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 354 So. 2d 718 (La. Ct. App.), writ
denied, 356 So. 2d 1011 (La. 1978); Jepson v. Stubbs, 555 S.W.2d 307 (Mo. 1977) (en banc);
Vavolizza v. Krieger, 33 N.Y.2d 351, 308 N.E.2d 439, 352 N.Y.S.2d 919 (1974); Weaver v. Carson,
62 Ohio App. 2d 99, 404 N.E.2d 1344 (1979); Gaito v. Matson, 228 Pa. Super. Ct. 288, 323 A.2d
753, cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1092 (1974); Garcia v. Ray, 556 S.W.2d 870 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977).
The earlier criminal malpractice cases are: Underwood v. Woods, 406 F.2d 910 (8th Cir.
1969); Lamore v. Laughlin, 159 F.2d 463 (D.C. Cir. 1947); Vance v. Robinson, 292 F. Supp. 786
(W.D.N.C. 1968); Olson v. North, 276 Ill. App. 457 (1934); Miller v. Ginsberg, 134 Minn. 397, 159
N.W. 950 (1916); Cleveland v. Cromwell, 128 A.D. 237, 112 N.Y.S. 643 (1908); Cleveland v.
Cromwell, 110 A.D. 82, 96 N.Y.S. 475 (1905); Malone v. Sherman, 49 N.Y. Super. 530 (1883);
Heathman v. Hatch, 13 Utah 2d 266, 372 P.2d 990 (1962).
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elements of both actions are identical. 5 Criminal malpractice cases,
however, present unique threshold issues. If the plaintiff does not pre-
vail on these threshold issues, a court may bar his claim without hear-
ing the merits of his case.
After reviewing the basic elements of legal malpractice actions,
this comment examines four threshold obstacles the criminal malprac-
tice plaintiff may have to overcome. First, a requirement of inno-
cence:6 a court may hold that a plaintiff who cannot demonstrate his
actual innocence of the underlying criminal charges cannot recover for
the malpractice of his defense attorney. Second, a unique application
of the doctrine of collateral estoppel:7 a client8 who raised and lost a
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in the underlying criminal
case may be estopped from attacking the performance of the attorney
in a subsequent criminal malpractice action. Third, the potential im-
munity of a court-appointed attorney:9 courts occasionally hold that a
court-appointed defense counsel or a public defender is immune from
malpractice liability. Finally, a trial lawyer, whether civil or criminal,
may be granted immunity from malpractice liability for any errors of
judgment he makes in the conduct of litigation.10 After examining
each of these potential bars, this comment concludes that a plaintiff
seeking to recover for the malpractice of his criminal defense attorney
should have to overcome no greater initial burden than his civil mal-
practice counterpart.
I. THE BASICS OF LEGAL MALPRACTICE
Most legal malpractice actions, whether civil or criminal, involve
professional negligence rather than intentional harm or fraud. In order
to recover the plaintiff must establish four basic elements.1 The first
5. Compare Bradshaw v. Pardee, Civ. No. 15444, slip op. at 3 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 13, 1978)
with Budd v. Nixen, 6 Cal. 3d 195, 200,491 P.2d 433,436,98 Cal. Rptr. 849, 852 (1971). See notes
11-23 infra and accompanying text.
6. See notes 24-48 infra and accompanying text.
7. See notes 49-74 infra and accompanying text.
8. Denoting a particular party is invariably confusing because criminal malpractice involves
two distinct actions: the actual malpractice suit and the underlying criminal trial. In this com-
ment the term "client" will be used to refer to the plaintiff in the malpractice suit who was the
defendant in the underlying criminal action. Similarly, the "attorney" represented the client in
the criminal trial and is the defendant in the criminal malpractice suit.
9. See notes 75-102 infia and accompanying text.
10. See notes 103-16 infra and accompanying text.
11. Kasten, Attorney Malfractice in Illinois: An Early Chapter in a Book Destinedfor Great
Length, 13 J. MAR. L. REv. 309,311 (1980). Compare Budd v. Nixen, 6 Cal. 3d 195,200,491 P.2d
433, 436, 98 Cal. Rptr. 849, 852 (1971) ("(1) the duty of the professional to use such skill, pru-
dence, and diligence as other members of his profession commonly possess and exercise; (2) a
breach of that duty; (3) a proximate causal connection between the negligent conduct and the
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element, the attorney's duty to his client, flows from the attorney-client
relationship,1 2 and normally poses no problem to the malpractice plain-
tiff. A defense attorney has the same duty to his client whether he is
appointed or retained.1 3
The malpractice plaintiff next must demonstrate that the attorney
breached a duty to his client by failing to exercise the proper degree of
care.14 The standard of care for legal malpractice is relatively uniform
throughout the United States; courts require the exercise of that degree
of skill and knowledge normally possessed either by other attorneys in
the community' 5 or by members of the profession generally.16 No sep-
arate standard of care has been established for criminal malpractice
cases. 17
resulting injury; and (4) actual loss or damage resulting from the professional's negligence") with
Herston v. Whitesell, 348 So. 2d 1054, 1057 (Ala. 1977) ("[A] duty, a breach of the duty, that the
breach was the proximate cause of the injury, and damages") and Hansen v. Wightman, 14 Wash.
App. 78, 88, 538 P.2d 1238, 1246 (1975) ("[The existence of an attorney-client relationship, tile
existence of a duty on the part of the lawyer, failure to perform the duty, and the negligence of the
lawyer must have been a proximate cause of damage to the client").
12. D. MEISELMAN, ATTORNEY MALPRACTICE: LAW AND PROCEDURE § 2:1 (1980). The at-
torney-client relationship usually results from the employment of the attorney by the client, see,
ag., Ventura County Humane Soe'y v. Holloway, 40 Cal. App. 3d 897, 903, 115 Cal. Rptr. 464,
468 (1974), but it can arise in other ways as well, see, e.g., Tormo v. Yormark, 398 F. Supp. 1159,
1169 (D.N.J. 1975) (attorney's promise to "see what could be done" concerning a legal matter is
sufficient to establish the relationship even without formal employment).
13. See Ferri v. Ackerman, 444 U.S. 193, 200 n.17 (1979); Sanchez v. Murphy, 385 F. Supp.
1362, 1364 (D. Nev. 1974); ABA PROJECT ON STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS
RELATING TO THE DEFENSE FUNCTION § 3.9 (1971). Similarly, the attorney's duty arises regard-
less of whether he has been paid a fee. Grudberg v. Midvale Realty Co., 119 Misc. 558, 559-60,
196 N.Y.S. 760, 761 (App. Term 1922); see Kasten, supra note 1I, at 311. But see Cleveland v.
Cromwell, 128 A.D. 237, 112 N.Y.S. 643 (1908) (that the attorney was a friend of the plaintiff, was
never paid for his services, and even contributed his own money to the settlement of plaintiffs
case was given weight in the decision not to hold the attorney liable).
14. An attorney is not liable for being in error about a question of law on which well-in-
formed lawyers may reasonably disagree. See, e.g., Kirsch v. Duryea, 21 Cal. 3d 303, 308, 578
P.2d 935, 938-39, 146 Cal. Rptr. 218, 222 (1978).
15. See Bradshaw v. Pardee, Civ. No. 15444, slip op. at 3 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 13, 1978);
Ramp v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 263 La. 774, 786, 269 So. 2d 239, 244 (1972); Cook,
Flanagan & Berst v. Clausing, 73 Wash. 2d 393, 395-96, 438 P.2d 865, 867 (1968). See also Com-
ment, New Developments in Legal Malpractice, 26 AM. U.L. Rv. 408, 415-21 (1977).
16. See Kirsch v. Duryea, 21 Cal. 3d 303, 308, 578 P.2d 935, 938, 146 Cal. Rptr. 218, 221-22
(1978); Hughes v. Malone, 146 Ga. App. 341, 344, 247 S.E.2d 107, 110-11 (1978); Olson v. North,
276 IM. App. 457, 473 (1934).
Most jurisdictions require expert testimony to establish the proper standard of care. See, e.g.,
Lipscomb v. Krause, 87 Cal. App. 3d 970, 975, 151 Cal. Rptr. 465, 468 (1978); Brown v. Gatlin, 19
Il App. 3d 1018, 1020, 313 N.E.2d 180, 182 (1974). Expert testimony is not required when the
attorney's negligence is obvious. Watkins v. Sheppard, 278 So. 2d 890, 892 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1973); Hill v. Okay Construction Co., 312 Minn. 324, 337, 252 N.W.2d 107, 116 (1977).
17. D. MEISELMAN, supra note 12, § 16:1. If the attorney holds himself out to be especially
qualified in an area of law, he may be held to a higher standard of care. Wright v. Williams, 47
[Vol. 1981:542
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The malpractice plaintiff also must prove that the breach of duty
proximately caused his damages. To prove proximate cause he must
establish the merits of his position in the underlying case, 18 and demon-
strate that with adequate counsel he would have received a more
favorable verdict. Proximate cause is often difficult to prove.19
Damages, the final element of the tort, are evaluated differently for
civil and criminal malpractice claims. The principles concerning civil
malpractice damages are settled: a client who has suffered a money
judgment as a result of his attorney's negligence is entitled to full com-
pensation;20 a client who was unsuccessful as the plaintiff in the under-
lying suit is entitled to the amount he would have recovered but for the
attorney's negligence.21 When a criminal defendant is convicted as a
result of his attorney's negligence, the damage determination is more
difficult. The criminal trial judge often has discretion to determine the
severity of the client's original sentence. The parole board determines
if the malpractice plaintiff deserves early release. The conviction itself
may make future employment difficult to obtain and mandate heavier
penalties for future crimes. Determining potential damages thus in-
volves evaluating multifarious considerations. Few courts have at-
tempted such a calculation,22 and useful principles have yet to evolve.23
All legal malpractice plaintiffs must establish the four essential ele-
ments of the action. Many courts require a plaintiff to litigate addi-
Cal. App. 3d 802, 810, 121 Cal. Rptr. 194, 199 (1975). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 299A, Comment d (1965).
18. The malpractice plaintiff therefore must prove a "suit within a suit." Wade, The Attor-
ney's Liabiliyfor Negligence, 12 VAND. L. Rnv. 755, 769 (1959); Note, A ModernApproach to the
LegalMalpractice Tort, 52 IND. L.J. 689, 692 (1977). See, e.g., Schneider v. Richardson, 411 A.2d
656, 658 (Me. 1979); Harding v. Bell, 265 Or. 202, 205, 508 P.2d 216, 217 (1973). Proving proxi-
mate causation also necessarily entails proving but for causation.
19. In some cases, however, an attorney's negligence may have so obviously resulted in a
disposition unfavorable to the plaintiff that detailed proof of proximate cause is unnecessary. See,
e.g., Geddie v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 354 So. 2d 718 (La. Ct. App.), writ denied, 356 So.
2d 1011 (La. 1978) (the maximum penalty for the crime was two years, and the attorney neglected
to object to the imposition of a four year sentence).
20. See, eg., Better Homes, Inc. v. Rodgers, 195 F. Supp. 93, 97 (N.D.W. Va. 1961); Pete v.
Henderson, 124 Cal. App. 2d 487, 489-90, 269 P.2d 78, 79 (1954).
21. See, ag., Williams v. Bashman, 457 F. Supp. 322,326 (E.D. Pa. 1978); Freeman v. Rubin,
318 So. 2d 540, 543 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975).
22. Courts have awarded damages in only two reported cases. See Geddie v. St. Paul Fire &
Marine Ins. Co., 354 So. 2d 718 (La. Ct. App.), writ denied, 356 So. 2d 1011 (La. 1978); Miller v.
Ginsberg, 134 Minn. 397, 159 N.W. 950 (1916). In Olson v. North, 276 IM. App. 457 (1934), a jury
awarded $29,500 to the plaintiffin a criminal malpractice suit. This sum was reduced to $7,500 by
the trial court. The case was reversed on appeal The appellate court noted that the magnitude of
the damages awarded showed passion and prejudice on the part of the jury.
23. A full discussion of damages is beyond the scope of this comment. One recent commen-
tator provides a fitting summary of the issue: from the perspective of both judge and jury, it
promises to be a nightmare. Kaus & Mallen, supra note 3, at 1220.
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tional threshold issues. Civil malpractice claims are relatively
common, and the questions a client can expect to litigate are well estab-
lished. Criminal malpractice suits are rare, however, and the courts
have not agreed on appropriate threshold issues for such actions.
II. THE REQUIREMENT OF INNOCENCE
Several courts have indicated that a criminal defendant who is ac-
tually guilty24 of the crime for which he was convicted cannot recover
in a malpractice action for his attorney's negligent failure to use a tech-
nical defense to win his release.25
The client must prove his actual innocence of the underlying
charge or his claim will be barred. No comparable burden exists-in
civil malpractice suits, 26 and no reason justifies imposing this burden
on criminal malpractice plaintiffs.
In Bradshaw v. Pardee27 the defendant in a criminal proceeding
had confessed his guilt to law enforcement officials and pleaded guilty
on advice of counsel. He then brought a criminal malpractice suit,
charging that his sentence was the proximate result of his attorney's
negligent advice. He alleged that if his attorney had properly per-
formed his legal duties, the criminal charges would have been reduced
or dismissed or, alternatively, his sentence would have been less severe.
The California Court of Appeals held that the client could not main-
tain the action, reasoning that if a criminal defendant was actually
guilty of the crime for which he was convicted, his prison sentence was
proximately caused by his guilt and not by the alleged negligence of his
24. The criminal law is designed to punish legal guilt. Actual guilt is a term of art:
First, its antonym, "innocence," merely means innocence of the crime of which the
client has been convicted. Thus, in the context of a claim that the lawyer's negligence
caused the client to be convicted of murder, guilt of manslaughter is the equivalent of
innocence.
Second, "actual guilt" does not mean actual guilt. No system of procedure and
proof can infallibly determine the client's guilt or innocence. By "actual guilt" we
merely mean guilt provable at the malpractice trial-a civil proceeding-with the aid of
all then available evidence admissible in such a trial.
Kaus & Mallen, supra note 3, at 1200 n.25; Vf Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? Collateralt-
tacks on CriminalJudgments, 38 U. CHI. L. Rav. 142, 160 (1970) (defining a colorable showing of
innocence in the context of collateral attack on a criminal conviction).
25. See, e.g., Walker v. Kruse, 484 F.2d 802, 804 (7th Cir. 1973); Bradshaw v. Pardee, Civ.
No. 15444, slip op. at 4-5 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 13, 1978); Garcia v. Ray, 556 S.W.2d 870, 872 (Tex.
Ct. App. 1977). See also Hughes v. Malone, 146 Ga. App. 341, 347, 247 S.E.2d 107, 112 (1978).
26. See Kaus & Mallen, supra note 3, at 1203:
In the context of civil malpractice, when a [defendant's] lawyer is sued for permit-
ting an action on a debt to go by default, the client need only show that he would have
prevailed had the case been defended on the merits. We do not ask him to prove in
addition that he did not actually owe the debt.




Had the Bradshaw court used the terms guilt or innocence in their
legal sense, its holding would have been entirely correct. A client who
is legally guilty cannot satisfy his burden of proximate cause (his "suit
within a suit" requirement); he cannot show that, but for the negligence
of his attorney, the result in the criminal case would have differed.29
The court, however, imposed a requirement of actual innocence. It re-
lied on two facts in reaching its decision: the confession and the guilty
plea.30 Neither demonstrates legal guilt. A confession does not pre-
empt a legal defense, for a layman may not know vhat defenses are
provided by the law. One of the functions of the attorney is to present
legal defenses not apparent to the layman. Certainly the guilty plea
does not prove legal guilt; the essence of the client's claim is that he was
negligently advised to plead guilty when he was in fact legally inno-
cent.3' Bradshaw, however, holds that an actually guilty client cannot
establish proximate causation.
The court's reasoning is flawed. A client who is actually guilty can
establish proximate causation by showing that he had a legal defense
that his attorney neglected to raise.32 For example, an actually guilty
client cannot be convicted once the statute of limitations has expired. In
such a situation the defendant is legally innocent and it is his attorney's
duty to raise that defense.33 If the attorney does not, and the client is
convicted, the attorney's negligence is the proximate cause of the con-
viction. In Bradshaw the requirement of innocence barred a potentially
valid claim even though there was no proof that the client was legally
guilty.
Although an actually guilty client may not be legally guilty, he
may be morally culpable. The expiration of the statute of limitations
makes him legally innocent, but it does not restore his virtue. Never-
28. Id, slip op. at 5-7. The court indicated that the client's actual guilt undercut his ability to
establish proximate cause: "Since plaintiff was indeed guilty, as he pleaded after being 'advised at
length about the consequences of the guilty plea' and having 'fully understood the nature of the
proceedings,' his prison sentence was caused by such guilt and not by defendant's alleged negli-
gence." Id, slip op. at 5. (footnote omitted).
29. Id, slip op. at 4-5.
30. See note 18 supra and accompanying text.
31. Of course, that a client is legally guilty of a lesser crime does not affect the negligent
nature of advice to plead guilty to a more serious offense.
32. See Martin v. Hall, 20 Cal. App. 3d 414, 97 Cal. Rptr. 730 (1971); Kaus & Mallen, supra
note 3, at 1226-31.
33. See ABA PROJECT ON STANDARDS FOR CRImiNAL JusncE, supra note 13, at 148
("[counsel's] role as advocate permits and requires that he press all points legally available, even if
he must subordinate his personal evaluation of the client's conduct"); ABA MODEL CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY AND CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, Canon 7, n.3 (1980) (quoting
ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS No. 5).
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theless, a defendant who is convicted because his attorney neglected to
raise a technical defense, such as the statute of limitations, should re-
cover damages. The criminal law imposes no requirement of actual
innocence; no reason exists to use actual guilt as a bar to civil recovery
for professional negligence. As a tort action, criminal malpractice
should focus on the activity of the alleged tortfeasor, not on the con-
duct of the victim. 3 4
The criminal courts, though affording defendants greater procedu-
ral safeguards than civil courts,35 do not impose a requirement of ac-
tual guilt when'they identify and punish criminal behavior. Because it
is impossible to ascertain moral culpability conclusively, the criminal
justice system is designed to punish only legal guilt. If an actually
guilty client has a viable defense to the criminal charge-for example,
that the statute of limitations has expired-the law considers him inno-
cent for reasons of public policy despite his moral culpability. 36
Dividing criminal malpractice claims into two categories more
clearly demonstrates the inappropriateness of considering actual guilt
in a tort action. The first category includes those cases in which the
client was legally guilty but, through the negligence of his attorney, was
either sentenced more heavily than the legal maximum or was con-
victed of a more serious crime than was legally appropriate. In this
34. Under conventional tort theory the doctrines of contributory negligence and assumption
of risk place the plaintiff's behavior at issue, but neither of these doctrines is relevant to a require-
ment of innocence. Being guilty of the original crime does not constitute contributory negligence
to the malpractice tort. When the client robs a liquor store, he is not increasing the risk that his
lawyer will be incompetent. See generally W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS, § 65 (4th ed. 1971). The
contributory negligence defense may be available to the attorney, however, if the defense is pre-
mised on client conduct that took place during the course of the trial, rather than on conduct that
occurred beforehand.
To apply the doctrine of assumption of the risk suggests that the client, by committting the
criminal act, has recognized the risk of malpractice and has relieved the attorney, in advance, of
his duty to use ordinary skill and knowledge. See id § 68.
35. The Constitution guarantees criminal defendants many rights, including the right to
counsel, the right to plead not guilty, and the right to be tried in a courtroom presided over by a
judge. Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723, 726-27 (1963). Comparable rights are not necessarily
afforded in civil actions. See, eg., Watson v. Moss, 619 F.2d 775, 776 (8th Cir. 1980). See gener-
ally Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 235-38 (1940).
36. See American Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 554 (1974); Order of R.R. Teleg-
raphers v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 321 U.S. 342, 348-49 (1944). The criminal law will not
penalize the client after the statute has run because the passage of time makes the evidence unreli-
able. Once the client proves his legal innocence in a civil proceeding by showing that the limita-
tions period has expired, it is irrational to require him to prove his actual innocence as well; the
evidence has not become more reliable by virtue of the civil forum. But cf. Kaufman v. United
States, 394 U.S. 217, 234 (1969) (Black, J., dissenting) (probable or possible innocence should be
given weight in determining whether judgment should be open to collateral attack); Friendly,
supra note 24 (a colorable showing of innocence should be prerequisite to collateral attack on a
criminal conviction).
Vol. 1981:542] CRIMINAL MALPRA CTICE
situation the attorney's negligence caused the client to suffer an exces-
sive penalty.37 Actual innocence is irrelevant;38 the client pays his debt
to society in any event. He is merely asking for damages for the excess
penalty.
The second category includes those cases in which the client was
legally innocent of any crime,39 but was convicted because of his attor-
ney's failure to raise an appropriate defense. If an actually guilty client
may recover damages for an excess penalty, it follows that a client may
recover damages if he should never have been convicted at all. Even
an actually guilty client is entitled to all appropriate defenses,40 and is
entitled to damages if his attorney neglects to present these defenses.
It may seem wrong for an actually guilty client to recover from his
attorney for failure to assert a technical defense on his behalf. Some
defenses, such as alibi, self-defense, and, in some cases, insanity, are
related to the question of a defendant's actual criminal guilt. Other
defenses reflect policies of the criminal justice system unrelated to the
actual guilt of the defendant. Examples of this kind of defense include
the exclusionary rule,41 the statute of limitations,42 and the rule against
improper grand jury selection.43 Because the policies behind these
technical defenses are not directly aimed at the defendant's actual guilt,
it may be argued that a criminal defendant should not recover from an
attorney who negligently fails to assert such a defense.44
37. The court in Geddie v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 354 So. 2d 718 (La. Ct. App.), writ
denied, 356 So. 2d 1011 (La. 1978), coined the term "excessive incarceration" to designate the time
spent in prison beyond the legal maximum. 354 So. 2d at 719.
38. See R. MALLEN & V. LEvrr, supra note I, § 248.
39. For simplicity, the text deals with a plaintiff who claims he is legally innocent of any
crime and was convicted solely due to malpractice. Alternatively, a plaintiff might admit his guilt
of a lesser crime, but bring suit because the malpractice caused his conviction on a more serious
charge. See Geddie v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 354 So. 2d 718 (La. Ct. App.), writ denied,
356 So. 2d 1011 (La. 1978). The rationale is the same in both cases: if the plaintiff can establish
that the criminal courts would have found him legally innocent of the crime for which he was
convicted, the civil courts should not demand additional proof of his innocence.
40. See text accompanying notes 46-47 infra.
41. The purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter police from making unreasonable
searches and seizures. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 12 (1968); Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S.
618, 629-35 (1965).
42. See note 36 supra.
43. Discrimination in the selection of grand jurors "strikes at the fundamental values of our
judicial system and our society as a whole . . ." Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545, 556 (1979).
44. In Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976), the Supreme Court held that a criminal defend-
ant may not seek habeas corpus relief on the basis of a state's denial of his fourth amendment
rights if he had a full and fair opportunity to assert his constitutional claim in the state court. Id
at 494. The Court suggested that federal habeas corpus relief may be unavailable to defendants
with claims unrelated to their actual guilt. Id at 489-90, 491 n.31. In Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S.
545 (1979), however, the Court permitted collateral review of the defendant's claim of racial dis-
crimination in the selection of a state grand jury, despite the fact that the claim was unrelated to
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The criminal law provides these technical defenses, however, for
valid policy reasons. 45 Defense attorneys owe a duty to their clients to
assert all reasonable defenses.46 An attorney who fails to raise a valid
technical defense is just as negligent as one who overlooks a viable
truth-related defense.47 Moreover, the policies behind technical de-
fenses are ill served if defense attorneys can freely choose whether to
raise them. The tort law of malpractice would subvert the criminal sys-
tem if it shielded attorneys from liability for failing to raise a technical
defense.
Even if a criminal malpractice plaintiff establishes all the elements
of his claim, few juries would award substantial damages to a criminal
who, they believe, received an appropriate sentence.48 Thus, even
without a judicially imposed requirement of innocence, an actually
guilty client will rarely recover damages for criminal malpractice. Nev-
ertheless, a client suing his criminal defense attorney for malpractice
should be required to prove only that he was legally innocent of the
charges against him, and should not have to prove his actual innocence.
the defendant's guilt. Similarly, in Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 342-44 (1980), the Court held
that federal habeas corpus relief could be available to a state prisoner claiming that his retained
counsel failed to provide him with effective assistance. Because the court of appeals award ofsuch
relief was based, in part, upon an improper weighing of the evidence of conflict-of-interest, the
Supreme Court vacated the decision. Thus, the Court is responding not only to Stone's guilt-
related standard but to other policies as well in determining the availability of collateral review.
See The Supreme Court, 1978 Term, 93 HARV. L. REv. 1, 203-05 (1979).
The guilt-related standard is inappropriate in criminal malpractice cases. Stone requires def-
erence to a state court's adjudication of a constitutional claim, but Rose allows collateral review
when the asserted constitutional claim impinges directly on the state court's ability to determine
the claim fairly. For discussion of Rose, see Duker, Rose v. Mitchell and Justice Lewis Powell:
The Role of Federal Courts and Federal Habeas, 23 How. L.J. 279, 281 (1980); The Supreme Court,
1978 Term, 93 HAv. L. REv. 1, 199-209 (1979). Federal deference to the competence of state
courts is not at issue in the context of criminal malpractice. Criminal malpractice is a state law
claim, often brought in state court. Moreover, the outcome of a criminal malpractice action has
no bearing on the finality or integrity of the prior criminal proceeding. While habeas corpus relief
results in the release of a state prisoner, malpractice results only in a damages award against his
defense attorney. The malpractice action is entirely separate from the underlying criminal pro-
ceeding, and therefore the policies involved are those of tort law, not of federalism or criminal
procedure.
45. See notes 41-43 supra.
46. See note 33 supra.
47. Cf., Christy v. Saliterman, 288 Minn. 144, 179 N.W.2d 288 (1970) (an attorney held liable
in civil malpractice, for neglecting to raise the technical statute of limitations defense).
48. See Kaus & Mallen, supra note 3, at 1203:
[W]hat would be the result of. . . this question: "Should a lawyer have to pay damages
to a guilty client because he negligently fails to secure an acquittal?" Surely a very sub-
stantial percentage of those polled would say that the guilty client is not entitled to dam-
ages since--God works in mysterious ways-'justice" was done. Would the public
really tolerate the thought of a prisoner, who is precisely where he ought to be, receiving
substantial damages for not being on the street planning to rob another bank?
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III. COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL
The doctrine of collateral estoppel4 9 is a potential defense to any
legal malpractice action. One application of the doctrine, however, is
unique to criminal malpractice suits. A client who has unsuccessfully
raised the constitutional claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in the
underlying criminal action5 o is estopped from relitigating identical is-
sues in a subsequent malpractice action against his defense attorney.51
This estoppel defense is inapplicable in civil malpractice actions; a
party to a civil suit has no opportunity to challenge the competence of
his attorney during the initial civil action because attorney incompe-
tence is not a basis for appeal.
Applying this form of estoppel in a criminal malpractice action is
justified only in certain circumstances. First, the issue barred from re-
litigation must be identical to an issue necessarily decided or actually
adjudicated in the prior proceeding.5 2 Second, the party against whom
the defense is asserted must have had a full and fair opportunity to
litigate the issues in the prior proceeding. 53 In the context of criminal
malpractice actions the second requirement generally presents no prob-
49. Collateral estoppel precludes relitigation of issues actually litigated and determined in a
prior suit, regardless of whether both suits involve the same cause of action. Lawlor v. National
Screen Serv. Corp., 349 U.S. 322, 326 (1955). See Polasky, Collateral Estoppel Effects of Prior
Litigation, 39 IowA L. REv. 217, 222 (1954). Although the doctrine usually precludes relitigation
of issues of fact, it may also bar issues of law. Vestal, Preclusion/Res Judicata Variables: Nature of
the Controversy, 1965 WASH. U.L.Q. 158, 171. See generally 1B MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE
0.441 (2d ed. 1948 & Supp. 1980).
50. U.S. CoNsr. amend. VI provides: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy
the right... to have.., the Assistance of Counsel for his defence." The right to counsel is the
right to effective assistance of counsel. McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n.14 (1970);
Reece v. Georgia, 350 U.S. 85, 90 (1955). See generally Note, Ideniffying andRemedying Ineffec-
live Assistance of Criminal Defense Counsel" A New Look After United States v. Decoster, 93
HARV. L. REv. 752,753-58 (1980). Any post-conviction proceeding in which the client seeks relief
on the ground that his defense counsel provided inadequate representation can form the basis for
estoppel in this context. See Vavolizza v. Krieger, 33 N.Y.2d 351, 351, 308 N.E.2d 439, 439, 352
N.Y.S.2d 919, 919 (1974).
51. See Walker v. Kruse, 484 F.2d 802, 803-04 (7th Cir. 1973); Vavolizza v. Krieger, 33
N.Y.2d 351, 355-56, 308 N.E.2d 439, 441-42, 352 N.Y.S.2d 919, 922-23 (1974); Garcia v. Ray, 556
S.W.2d 870, 872 (rex. Civ. App. 1977). In Walker and Garcia the prior proceeding was a direct
appeal of the client's criminal conviction. In Vavolizza the client had previously challenged his
attorney's conduct in a collateral review proceeding.
52. Alabama Farm Bureau Mut. Cas. Ins. Co. v. Moore, 349 So. 2d 1113, 1116 (Ala. 1977);
People v. Taylor, 12 Cal. 3d 686, 691, 527 P.2d 622, 625, 117 Cal. Rptr. 70, 73 (1974) (en banc);
Vavolizza v. Krieger, 33 N.Y.2d 351, 356, 308 N.E.2d 439, 442, 352 N.Y.S.2d 919, 923 (1974); IB
MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 0.443[2] (2d ed. 1948 & Supp. 1980).
53. Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 328 (1978); Blonder-Tongue Laboratories,
Inc. v. University of Ill. Foundation, 402 U.S. 313, 329 (1971); Johnson v. United States, 576 F.2d
606, 614 (5th Cir. 1978); Borland v. Gillespie, 206 Neb. 191, 199, 292 N.W.2d 26,31 (1980); Hicks
v. De La Cruz, 52 Ohio St. 2d 71, 74, 369 N.E.2d 776, 778 (1977). An actual hearing is not
required. An issue that is submitted and determined on a motion for summary judgment, for
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lem. The client had his day in court when his claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel was litigated in the underlying criminal action.
The first requirement, however-that the issues be identical-is not so
easily satisfied.
Either of two elements of an ineffective assistance claim may form
the basis of a collateral action. The first is inadequate representation.5 4
In both the ineffective assistance claim and the criminal malpractice
suit the client must establish that counsel provided him with inade-
quate representation in the underlying criminal case. When the pro-
ceedings use the identical standard to determine whether the attorney
fulfilled his duty, a prior determination that the attorney provided ade-
quate representation bars the client from relitigating the issue in the
malpractice action. The client is bound by the prior determination that
counsel provided adequate representation, 55 and therefore cannot re-
cover.
In some jurisdictions, however, courts apply different standards for
judging the performance of counsel in malpractice actions than in inef-
fective assistance proceedings. The standard used in malpractice ac-
tions is relatively uniform: courts require attorneys to exercise that
degree of skill and knowledge normally possessed by their colleagues.5 6
example, will be precluded from relitigation. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 68,
Comment d (rent. Draft No. 4, 1977).
Historically, courts applied a third prerequisite: unless both parties in an action were bound
by a judgment in a previous case, neither party could use the prior judgment as determinative of
an issue in the second action. See, e.g., Triplett v. Lowell, 297 U.S. 638, 645 (1935). This "mutu-
ality of estoppel" is no longer a strict requirement of collateral estoppel. Blonder-Tongue Labora-
tories, Inc. v. University of Il Foundation, 402 U.S. 313, 349-50 (1971). See generally Semmel,
Collateral Estoppel, Mutuality and Ainder of Parties, 68 COLUM. L. REv. 1457 (1968).
54. "Inadequate representation" is a generic term. In the criminal malpractice context it re-
fers to the essential element of breach of duty. The client demonstrates inadequate representation
by showing that his attorney breached his duty of care by exercising a degree of skill and knowl-
edge less than that of other members of the profession. See notes 15-16 supra and accompanying
text.
To establish the element of inadequate representation in an ineffective assistance of counsel
proceeding, the client must demonstrate that the attorney's representation fell below the constitu-
tionally required standard of minimum competence for defense counsel. This standard may or
may not be identical to that of malpractice, because jurisdictions do not agree on the proper
standard of care for ineffective assistance of counsel claims. See notes 57-84 infra and accompa-
nying text.
55. A client who succeeds on his ineffective assistance claim and is subsequently released
might nevertheless bring a malpractice action and assert that the delay of his release was his
damage. See Underwood v. Woods, 406 F.2d 910, 916-17 (8th Cir. 1969). The finding that the
representation was inadequate, however, will not bar the attorney from claiming that his perform-
ance was competent in a subsequent malpractice suit. The attorney is not a party to the ineffective
assistance proceeding and thus litigates the issue of his professional competence for the first time
in the malpractice action.
56. See notes 15-16 supra and accompanying text.
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The standard used to determine whether a client has received constitu-
tionally effective assistance of counsel, however, varies from jurisdic-
tion to jurisdiction.57 The Supreme Court has held that the attorney's
advice must be "within the range of competence demanded of attor-
neys in criminal cases." 58 Most courts follow this standard, or the simi-
lar test of "reasonable competency. ' 59 If the court determining the
assistance of counsel claim uses this standard, the malpractice standard
may be sufficiently analogous to provide the requisite identity of is-
sues.60
Some jurisdictions6' regard counsel to be ineffective only when the
purported representation was of such a character as to turn the pro-
ceedings into "a farce and mockery ofjustice."62 In jurisdictions apply-
ing the "farce and mockery" standard, the client's failure to establish
ineffective assistance of counsel should not bar him from attacking the
attorney's competence in a subsequent criminal malpractice suit. The
two proceedings do not present identical issues because they apply dif-
ferent standards in determining the adequacy of counsel. A client who
cannot establish a "farce" may still be capable of demonstrating that
his attorney's actions lacked ordinary skill and knowledge. The requi-
site identity of issues therefore is not present between the constitutional
57. Maryland v. Marzullo, 435 U.S. 1011, 1011-12 (1978) (White, J., dissenting). For a listing
of the standards used by the various federal courts of appeals and state courts, see Erickson,
Standards of Competencyfor Defense Counselin a Criminal Case, 17 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 233, 237-
40 (1979); Note, IneffectiveAssistance ofCounsel: The Lingering Debate, 65 CORNELL L. REV. 659,
661 nn.7-8 (1980); Note, CriminalProcedure-In efectiveAssistance ofCounsel, 53 TEMP. L.Q. 193,
198 n.33 (1980).
58. McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970).
59. See, e.g., Cooper v. Fitzharris, 586 F.2d 1325, 1330 (9th Cir. 1978) (en banc), cert. denied,
440 U.S. 974 (1979); United States v. Easter, 539 F.2d 663, 666 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 844
(1976); People v. Blalock, 197 Colo. 320, 325, 592 P.2d 406, 409 (1979); White v. State, 309 Minn.
476, 480-81, 248 N.W.2d 281, 285 (1976).
60. Some courts have forged standards for effective assistance of counsel that are virtually
identical to legal malpractice standards. See, e.g., United States v. Hood, 593 F.2d 293, 297 (8th
Cir. 1979) ("In order to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must
show that his attorney failed to exercise the customary skill and diligence that a reasonably com-
petent attorney would perform under similar circumstances"); Moore v. United States, 432 F.2d
730, 736 (3d Cir. 1970) ("[Ihe standard of adequacy of legal services. . . is the exercise of the
customary skill and knowledge which normally prevails at the time and place").
61. See Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 117 n.16 (1977) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Note, 53
TEMP. L.Q., s.pra note 57, at 198 n.33.
62. E.g., United States v. Bubar, 567 F.2d 192, 201-02 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 872
(1977); Gillihan v. Rodriguez, 551 F.2d 1182, 1187 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 845 (1977);
State v. Smith, 112 Ariz. 208, 209, 540 P.2d 680, 681 (1975) (en banc); State v. Miller, 173 Mont.
453, 455, 568 P.2d 130, 132 (1977).
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and tort claims, 63 and rejection of the former should not bar litigation
of the latter.64
The element of prejudice is the second issue in an ineffective
assistance determination that may bar the client's subsequent malprac-
tice action. The question of prejudice arises in an ineffective assistance
proceeding only after the client has established that his attorney pro-
vided inadequate representation. The court then determines whether
counsel's substandard conduct actually damaged the client's case.65
Prejudice is analogous to the element of proximate cause in malpractice
suits.
6 6
The jurisdictions are split concerning whether prejudice is an es-
sential element of a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.67 In ju-
63. See Brown v. Schiff, 614 F.2d 237 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 941 (1980). The
plaintiffs in Brown sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976), alleging that the representation by their
court-appointed attorneys had violated their constitutional rights. The Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit, which applies the farce and mockery standard, see Gillihan v. Rodriguez, 551 F.2d
1182, 1187 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 845 (1977), held:
[Nione of the alleged conduct by court appointed defense counsel in these cases is so
egregious as to be violative of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Claims of legal
malpractice do not achieve constitutional status solely by virtue of a claimant's status as
a defendant in a criminal proceeding. At most, appellants' allegations sound in tort and
a more proper forum could be provided in state court.
614 F.2d at 239. Cf. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 107 (1976) (a doctor's treatment of a prisoner,
while not a violation of the eighth amendment, may still give rise to a medical malpractice claim).
64. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 68.1(d) (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1977).
65. See Cooper v. Fitzharris, 586 F.2d 1325, 1331 (9th Cir. 1978) (en banc), cert. denied, 440
U.S. 974 (1980).
66. A criminal malpractice plaintiff must show that, but for his attorney's substandard per-
formance, he would have won a more favorable verdict. See note 19 supra and accompanying
text. The client's burden to prove prejudice in an ineffective assistance claim, however, is more
easily satisfied. See, e.g., United States v. Decoster, 624 F.2d 196, 208 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (en banc)
(the defendant must prove a likelihood that counsel's inadequacy affected the outcome of the trial;
the burden then shifts to the government to show that no prejudice resulted); Davis v. Alabama,
596 F.2d 1214, 1221 (5th Cir. 1979) (the defendant need show only that his counsel's actions were
not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt), vacated and remanded, 446 U.S. 903 (1980); People v.
Pope, 23 Cal. 3d 412, 424, 590 P.2d 859, 866, 152 Cal. Rptr. 732, 739 (1979) (en banc) (the defend-
ant must establish that his counsel's performance resulted in the withdrawal of a potentially meri-
torious defense). But see United States v. Ritch, 583 F.2d 1179, 1183 (1st Cir.) (the defendant has
the burden of establishing actual prejudice when claiming that attorney was insufficiently pre-
pared for trial), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 970 (1978). Prior failure to satisfy an easier burden on an
issue bars the client from subsequently relitigating the issue under a heavier burden. See generally
lB MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 0.418[l] (2d ed. 1948 & Supp. 1980); 64 HARV. L. REV. 1376,
1378 (1951). If'the client cannot prove prejudice in the prior proceeding, he should be barred
from attempting to establish proximate cause in the malpractice suit.
67. Compare Beasley v. United States, 491 F.2d 687, 696 (6th Cir. 1974), and Moore v.
United States, 432 F.2d 730, 737 (3d Cir. 1970) (en banc), and Coles v. Peyton, 389 F.2d 224, 226
(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 849 (1968) (the defendant is not required to establish prejudice),
with United States v. Ritch, 583 F.2d 1179, 1183 (Ist Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 970 (1978), and
United States ex rel Johnson v. Johnson, 531 F.2d 169, 177 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 997
(1976), and People v. Pope, 23 Cal. 3d 412, 425, 590 P.2d 859, 866, 152 Cal. Rptr. 732, 739 (1979)
(defendant must show that his counsel's incompetence prejudiced his case). See generally Note,
Inefective Assistance of Counsel- The Lingering Debate, 65 CORNELL L. REV. 659 (1980).
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risdictions in which a criminal defendant need not show prejudice to
have his conviction reversed, the issue is never raised in the ineffective
assistance proceeding and cannot bar recovery in a later malpractice
action.68 In jurisdictions in which a client must show prejudice to es-
tablish his claim of ineffective assistance, a determination that the cli-
ent was not harmed by his attorney's negligence precludes relitigation
of the issue of proximate cause in a subsequent malpractice action.
69
A court may not necessarily bar a criminal malpractice action even
when the essential elements of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim
are identical to those of a criminal malpractice action and the client
fails to establish these elements in the former proceeding. When a cli-
ent bases his malpractice claim upon factual allegations that he did not
raise in the ineffective assistance proceeding, the malpractice claim is
not barred by the prior adjudication. 70 If, for example, the client
claims he was denied effective assistance of counsel because his attor-
ney failed to object to the admission of illegally obtained evidence and
that claim is rejected, the client is not barred from bringing a subse-
quent malpractice action claiming that his attorney neglected to raise a
valid statute of limitations defense'71
The malpractice court should determine whether the issue of prejudice was actually litigated
in the prior proceeding. Some courts decide on a case-by-case basis whether to require the client
to prove prejudice. See, e.g., Thomas v. Wyrick, 535 F.2d 407, 414 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 868 (1976); United States ex rel Green v. Rundle, 434 F.2d 1112, 1115 (3d Cir. 1970).
68. When a showing of prejudice is not a necessary part of an ineffective assistance claim, the
client litigates the issue of prejudice for the first time at the malpractice trial. Collateral estoppel
on this issue is therefore inapplicable.
69. A determination at the ineffective assistance hearing that the client was not prejudiced by
his counsel's inadequate representation forms a basis for collateral estoppel regardless of what
standard of inadequate representation the court used. If the client cannot prove in the prior pro-
ceeding that counsel's conduct prejudiced him, he will be barred from attempting to establish the
element of proximate cause in the subsequent malpractice suit.
70. But cf. Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1 (1963) (addressing the problem of what effect
denial of a prior application for federal collateral relief should have on a subsequent application
for relief). The Sanders Court stated:
Controlling weight may be given to denial of a prior application for federal habeas
corpus or [28 U.S.C.] § 2255 relief only if (1) the same ground presented in the subse-
quent application was determined adversely to the applicant on the prior application,
(2) the prior determination was on the merits, and (3) the ends of justice would not be
served by reaching the merits of the subsequent application.
(1) By "ground," we mean simply a sufficient legal basis for granting the relief
sought by the applicant. For example, the contention that an involuntary confession was
admitted in evidence against him is a distinct ground for federal collateral relief. But a
claim of involuntary confession predicated on alleged psychological coercion does not
raise a different "ground" than does one predicated on alleged physical coercion. In
other words, identical grounds may often be proved by different factual allegations.
Id at 15-16 (footnote omitted). See also lB MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 0.443[2] (2d ed. 1948
& Supp. 1980).
71. Whether the factual allegations that underlie a malpractice suit are identical to those
pleaded in the ineffective assistance proceeding may be unclear. See Vavolizza v. Krieger, 39
A.D.2d 446, 336 N.Y.S.2d 748 (1972), aff'd, 33 N.Y.2d 351, 308 N.E.2d 439, 352 N.Y.S.2d 919
(1974).
Vol. 1981:542]
DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 1981:542
Before barring a criminal malpractice claim on the basis of collat-
eral estoppel, a court should carefully determine what issues were adju-
dicated in the prior litigation. If it is not clear that the same issues were
presented, the plaintiff should be provided the opportunity to prove his
case.72 Even if the malpractice court finds that a substantially identical
issue was considered in the prior proceeding, collateral estoppel should
not automatically be applied.73 No danger of burdening the attorney
with the necessity of relitigating an issue arises because of this judicial
approach.74 The attorney was not a party to the prior proceeding, so he
will have to defend himself only once. The rationale underlying the
estoppel doctrine thus is not particularly compelling in the criminal
malpractice context, and a court that has any doubts about the identity
of issues or the fairness of the prior proceeding should not hesitate to
allow the client a hearing.
IV. IMMUNITY FOR COURT-APPOINTED COUNSEL
A client who was represented in the underlying criminal action by
court-appointed counsel may face a third threshold barrier to recovery
for malpractice. Several federal courts75 have held that a public de-
fender76 or court-appointed attorney77 enjoys immunity from suit, in-
72. "In short we should not evoke collateral estoppel when so many doubts exist as to
whether what happened earlier should operate now as a bar to plaintiff's claim. The facts relied
on to establish estoppel should be established far more clearly and convincingly than they are
here." Vavolizza v. Krieger, 39 A.D.2d 446, 450, 336 N.Y.S.2d 748, 752-53 (1972) (Markewich, J.,
dissenting), af'd, 33 N.Y.2d 351, 308 N.E.2d 439, 352 N.Y.S.2d 919 (1974).
73. The doctrine is merely a matter ofjudicial policy, to which courts make exceptions in the
interest of justice. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS, Introductory Notes § 68-68.1
(Tent. Draft No. 1, 1973); Vestal, Rationale of Preclusion, 9 ST. Louis U.L.J. 29, 54-55 (1964).
74. The doctrine of collateral estoppel is based on the twin policies of conserving judicial
resources and protecting litigants from the burden of reitigation. Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore,
439 U.S. 322, 326 (1979). Because the policy of protecting litigants from the burden of reitigation
is absent in criminal malpractice cases, courts should be slower to apply the doctrine in this con-
text.
75. Because state malpractice actions have been rare until recently, most claims against ap-
pointed counsel have arisen under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976). Some of these decisions held that a
court-appointed attorney enjoys judicial immunity from suit, and dismissed the claim. E.g.,
Brown v. Joseph, 463 F.2d 1046, 1049 (3d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 950 (1973). A case
involving this issue is currently before the Supreme Court. See Dodson v. Polk County, 628 F.2d
1104 (8th Cir. 1980), cert. granted, 49 U.S.L.W. 3635 (U.S. Mar. 3, 1981) (No. 80-824). Other
courts have reasoned that appointed counsel do not act under color of state law. E.g., Page v.
Sharpe, 487 F.2d 567 (Ist Cir. 1973); Espinoza v. Rogers, 470 F.2d 1174 (10th Cir. 1972).
76. Robinson v. Bergstrom, 579 F.2d 401, 411 (7th Cir. 1978); Miller v. Barilla, 549 F.2d 648,
649-50 (9th Cir. 1977); Brown v. Joseph, 463 F.2d 1046 (3d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 950
(1973).
77. Minns v. Paul, 542 F.2d 899 (4th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1102 (1977); see
Walker v. Kruse, 484 F.2d 802, 804-05 (7th Cir. 1973).
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cluding immunity from criminal malpractice claims.78  In Ferri v.
Ackerman,79 however, the Supreme Court unanimously held that fed-
eral law does not protect court-appointed counsel from state criminal
malpractice claims. Two recent state court decisions found that no
such immunity derives from state law.80
Ferri was indicted by a federal grand jury on a conspiracy charge.
The district court appointed Ackerman as Ferri's counsel pursuant to
the Criminal Justice Act of 1964.1 After being convicted of conspir-
acy, Ferri sued Ackerman for malpractice. The state trial court dis-
missed the complaint, and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed.82
The state supreme court considered itself bound by federal law and
held that federal principles of immunity were properly extended to
court-appointed counsel.8 3
The Supreme Court reversed. It concluded that federal law did
not immunize court-appointed attorneys from civil liability for mal-
practice. The Court recognized that a state may provide such immu-
nity as a matter of state law, but that a state was under no federal
compulsion to do so.84 The Ferri Court rejected the argument that by
providing compensation to court-appointed attorneys through the
Criminal Justice Act of 1964, Congress intended to immunize such
counsel from civil liability. Nothing in the language of the statute, nor
in its legislative history, suggested such an intent.8 5
The Court then considered whether, apart from the statute, the
federal doctrines of official or judicial immunity extend to counsel ap-
pointed to represent an indigent criminal defendant in federal court. It
found that court-appointed attorneys did not warrant such immunity.
78. In Sullens v. Carroll, 308 F. Supp. 311 (M.D. Fla. 1970), aff'd, 446 F.2d 1392 (5th Cir.
1971), the plaintiff brought a malpractice action against his court-appointed attorney in federal
court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976). The district court dismissed on the ground that an attorney
appointed by a federal court does not act under color of state law. The plaintiff then brought his
claim as a diversity suit for criminal malpractice. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held
the court-appointed attorney to be immune from malpractice liability. See Sulleas v. Carroll, 446
F.2d 1392, 1392-93 (5th Cir. 1971).
79. 444 U.S. 193 (1979).
80. Spring v. Constantino, 168 Conn. 563, 362 A.2d 871 (1975); Reese v. Danforth, 486 Pa.
479, 406 A.2d 735 (1979). Spring involved a criminal malpractice claim against a public defender.
Reese was a negligence action against a public defender who had represented the plaintiff in
involuntary commitment proceedings. In each case the court arrived at the same conclusion: once
the attorney is assigned to a client, his function does not differ from that of a private attorney. 168
Conn. at 567, 362 A.2d at 875; 486 Pa. at 486, 406 A.2d at 739.
81. 18 U.S.C. § 3006A (Supp. II 1978).
82. Ferri v. Ackerman, 483 Pa. 90, 394 A.2d 553 (1978), rev'd, 444 U.S. 193 (1979).
83. 483 Pa. at 99, 394 A.2d at 558.
84. 444 U.S. at 198.
85. Id. at 199.
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The court reasoned that judges and prosecutors enjoyed such immunity
because "[a]s public servants, they represent the interest of society as a
whole."86 The conduct of their official duties affects many individuals,
each of whom may be a source of future controversy. The law confers
immunity on these officials to provide them with the maximum ability
to "deal fearlessly and impartially with the public."87 In contrast, a
court-appointed lawyer, like a privately retained attorney, represents
only his client. His conduct does not directly affect the public at large,
and immunity should not extend to him.88
Proponents of immunity for appointed counsel advance several
policy arguments in support of their position.89 First, they cite "the
need to encourage counsel in the full exercise of professionalism." 90
Appointed attorneys need to have the discretion "to decline to press the
frivolous, to assign priorities between indigent litigants, and to make
strategic decisions [in the course of litigation] . ... -91 This argument
presents valid concerns that could be resolved by a grant of immunity.
The problem of professional discretion is faced by all attorneys, how-
ever, not merely by appointed counsel. Retained and court-appointed
attorneys perform identical duties. Each requires freedom to exercise
professional discretion, and appointed counsel merit no special treat-
ment.
A second argument in favor of immunity, based on the public's
interest in avoiding repetitive litigation,92 exhibits a similar weakness.
To establish a malpractice claim a client must prove that, but for the
attorney's negligence, he would have been acquitted, convicted of a
lesser crime, or given a less severe penalty. A client can make this
showing of proof only when a criminal case that has been settled is
86. Id at 202-03.
87. Id at 203.
88. Id at 204. See generally Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 420-29 (1975); Note, Reme-
diesAgainst the United States andIts Officials, 70 HARV. L. Rav. 827, 833-38 (1957); 30 U. FLA. L.
REv. 810 (1978).
89. See Reese v. Danforth, 486 Pa. 479, 495, 406 A.2d 735, 743 (1979) (Manderino, J., dis-
senting); Rondel v. Worsley, [1969] 1 A.C. 191 (H.L.); Mallen, The Court-Appointed Lawyer and
Legal Malpractice-Liability or Immunity?, in PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY OF TRIAL LAWYERS:
THE MALPRACTICE QUESTION 36 (1979).
90. Minns v. Paul, 542 F.2d 899, 901 (4th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1102 (1977).
91. Id Accord, Reese v. Danforth, 486 Pa. 479, 485-86, 406 A.2d 735, 739 (1979). Lord
Pearce best expressed this view in Rondel v. Worsley, [1969] 1 A.C. 191 (H.L.), when he wrote:
It is impossible to expect an advocate to prune his case of irrelevancies against his client's
wishes if he faces an action for negligence when he does so. Prudence will always be
prompting him to ask every question and call every piece of evidence that his client
wishes, in order to avoid the risk of getting involved [in a malpractice action].
Id at 273.
92. Reese v. Danforth, 486 Pa. 479,495,406 A.2d 735, 743 (1979) (Manderino, J., dissenting);
Kaus & Mallen, supra note 2, at 1192 n.5. See Rondel v. Worsley, [1969] 1 A.C. 191, 230 (H.L.).
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retried in a civil court. The argument contends that judicial finality
would be undermined by this practice.93 This argument, like the first,
fails to explain why appointed counsel should be granted unique pro-
tection. Any malpractice action based upon underlying litigation in-
volves to some extent the retrial of a closed case. Under this rationale,
both retained criminal defense counsel and attorneys who litigate civil
cases also should be immunized. 94
Several significant distinctions, however, exist between appointed
attorneys and privately retained counsel. First, an appointed attorney
cannot choose his clients; he cannot "assay the likelihood that the frus-
trations of a client's case may lead to recriminations and, ultimately,
litigation. . ... 95 Nor does the client have the opportunity to select
an attorney with whom he feels comfortable. Consequently, the attor-
ney-client relationship may commence in an atmosphere of suspicion
and hostility and, if the client is convicted, end in bitterness. 96 Further-
more, because he does not pay for the lawyer's services, an indigent is
more likely to urge his counsel to press frivolous appeals and raise mer-
itless defenses. 97 If the attorney refuses to comply, the client may be-
lieve he is entitled to damages for malpractice.98 Finally, many courts
cite the need to recruit able lawyers to represent indigent defendants.99
Appointed attorneys may be particularly vulnerable to malpractice
actions, but all attorneys are vulnerable in some degree to such suits.
93. Rondel v. Worsley, [1969] 1 A.C. 191, 230 (H.L.).
94. Some authorities advocate immunity for all trial lawyers for their errors of judgment in
the conduct of litigation. See notes 104-06 infra and accompanying text.
95. Reese v. Danforth, 486 Pa. 479,494,406 A.2d 735, 743 (1979) (Manderino, J., dissenting).
96. See Ferri v. Ackerman, 444 U.S. 193, 200 n.17 (1979).
97. See Brown v. Joseph, 463 F.2d 1046, 1049 (3d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 950
(1973). The Brown court noted that complaints under section 1983 are usually pro se, 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 (1976). An indigent plaintiff pays nothing to file a section 1983 claim; thus an indigent
receiving a court-appointed attorney would be more likely to bring such a claim than would the
client of a privately retained attorney, who would pay to press his section 1983 suit. The Brown
court used this logic to grant immunity to a court-appointed attorney. 463 F.2d at 1049. Because
the attorney in Ferri was appointed by a federal court, the decision does not necessarily preclude
an attorney appointed by a state court and sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976) from claiming
immunity. The Supreme Court has recently granted certiorari to decide whether state court-ap-
pointed attorneys are amenable to suit under section 1983. See Dodson v. Polk County, 628 F.2d
1104 (8th Cir. 1980), cert. granted, 49 U.S.L.W. 3635 (U.S. Mar. 3, 1981) (No. 80-824).
98. An attorney may always request the court's permission to withdraw from the case. The
procedure may be time consuming, see Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967), and if the
court denies permission the attorney-client relationship will almost certainly have deteriorated.
Certainly, the attorney may decide to take the extra appeal or make the extra argument rather
than to go through an unsuccessful withdrawal procedure.
99. See, eg., Minns v. Paul, 542 F.2d 899, 901 (4th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1102
(1977); Brown v. Joseph, 463 F.2d 1046, 1049 (3d Cir. 1972); Reese v. Danforth, 486 Pa. 479, 486,
406 A.2d 735, 739 (1979).
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Retained lawyers may handle cases that carry equal or greater risks of
client dissatisfaction. A convicted defendant facing a long prison term
may feel bitter regardless of whether his attorney was retained or ap-
pointed. Attorneys who litigate civil matters also are vulnerable, and if
the stakes are high enough, the losing party may try to recover his loss
in a malpractice suit. Most attorneys are not immune from suit; they
protect themselves by more conventional methods, such as malpractice
insurance. The appointed attorney can protect himself in the same
way. 1oo
A court discriminates against indigent clients when it permits re-
tained but not appointed attorneys to be held liable for their negli-
gence.'01 Poor clients become doubly disadvantaged: they may neither
choose their lawyer nor recover damages if the appointed attorney is
negligent. Far from improving the quality of indigent representation,immunity for appointed counsel will reduce the quality of representa-
tion available to the poor. Paid less than private attorneys and insu-
lated from malpractice liability, court-appointed counsel will almost
certainly render less effective representation.
Finally, even if the proponents of immunity are correct, the ques-
tion is better suited to legislative than judicial determination.10 2 A state
legislature may decide that public policy demands such immunity for
appointed counsel, and confer it by statute. In the absence of legisla-
tive action, however, the judiciary should not extend immunity to
court-appointed attorneys.
V. IMMUNITY FOR ERRORS OF JUDGMENT IN THE
CONDUCT OF LITIGATION
A court may grant an attorney immunity from liability for any
errors made in the conduct of civil or criminal litigation. 0 3 This im-
munity is grounded in two independent theories. First, trial attorneys
100. R. MALLEN & V. LEVIT, supra note 1, § 175; Mallen, supra note 89, at 43.
101. Ferri v. Ackerman, 483 Pa. 90, 100-01, 394 A.2d 553, 559 (1978) (Roberts, J., dissenting),
rev'd, 444 U.S. 193 (1979).
102. Ferri v. Ackerman, 444 U.S. 193, 205 (1979).
103. See Woodruffv. Tomlin, 423 F. Supp. 1284, 1288 (W.D. Tenn. 1976), rev'd, 593 F.2d 33
(6th Cir. 1979), af'din part, rev'din part on rehearing en bane, 616 F.2d 924 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,
101 S. Ct. 246 (1980); Stricklan v. Koella, 546 S.W.2d 810, 814 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1976). See gener-
ally Beckham, Trial Lawyer's Liabilityfor Judgmental Decisions, in PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY OF
TRIAL LAWYERS: THE MALPRACTICE QUESTION 157 (1979); Haskell, The Trial Lawyer' Immunity
from Liability for Errors of Judgment, in PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY OF TRIAL LAWYERS: THE
MALPRACTICE QUESTION 141 (1979); Thomason,A Pleafor Absolute Immunityfor Errors in Trial
Judgment, 14 WILLAMET E L.J. 369 (1978).
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should not be liable for mere errors of judgment. 0 4 Decisions of trial
tactics are within an attorney's professional discretion and errors of
judgment should not result in liability. This argument, however, does
not justify absolute immunity for a negligent trial attorney.10 5
The second argument for trial-attorney immunity is that regardless
of the existence of negligence, a malpractice plaintiff rarely can estab-
lish conclusively the element of proximate cause. 10 6 Causation is obvi-
ous when an attorney negligently omits a defense which, had it been
asserted, would have resulted in a favorable judgment in the initial pro-
ceeding as a matter of law.107 Causation is not obvious, however, when
the malpractice plaintiff alleges that the omitted defense would have
prevailed, not as a matter of law, but because it would have persuaded
the jury to reach a more favorable result.'0 8 The causation burden is
difficult to carry in this instance because the malpractice plaintiff never
can establish conclusively what the jury in the underlying case would
have decided. The uncertainty of this causal connection is the major
premise supporting immunity for errors of judgment in the conduct of
litigation: "Only by pure guesswork can the verdict of a jury be ex-
amined and a so-called cause for that verdict be determined. No man
shall suffer a judgment against him based on guess." 10 9 Many courts
allow such speculation in malpractice suits.10 The causation argument
supporting immunity, however, is sensible; there is valid concern that
the "suit within a suit" provides too tenuous a causal link to establish
104. Dorfv. Relles, 355 F.2d 488, 492 (7th Cir. 1966); Woodruffv. Tomlin, 423 F. Supp. 1284,
1288 (W.D. Tenn. 1976), rep'd, 593 F.2d 33 (6th Cir. 1979), aff'd in par, rev'd in part on rehearing
en bane, 616 F.2d 924 (6th Cir.), cert denied, 101 S. Ct. 246 (1980); Baker v. Beal, 225 N.W.2d 106,
112 (Iowa 1975). See R. MALLEN & V. LEViT, supra note 1, § 11.
105. Siegel v. Kranis, 29 A.D.2d 477, 479, 288 N.Y.S.2d 831, 834 (1968); R. MALLEN & V.
LEviT, supra note 1, § I11; Beckham, supra note 103, at 160.
106. See Woodruff v. Tomlin, 423 F. Supp. 1284, 1288 (W.D. Tenn. 1976), rev'd, 593 F.2d 33
(6th Cir. 1979), aJf'dinpart, rev'dinpart on rehearing en bane, 616 F.2d 924 (6th Cir.), cert denied,
101 S. Ct. 246 (1980); Stricklan v. Koella, 546 S.W.2d 810, 813 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1976); Haskell,
supra note 103, at 141-42; Thomason, supra note 103, at 383.
107. See Better Homes, Inc. v. Rodgers, 195 F. Supp. 93, 97 (N.D.W. Va. 1961). For example,
there is no difficulty in establishing causation if the defense attorney neglects to raise a valid
statute of limitations defense.
108. Negligence is assumed for the purposes of the present discussion. Naturally, the decision
not to assert a defense, which might have led to a more favorable result, would not be a basis for
malpractice if the attorney exercised ordinary skill and knowledge in making his decision. See
note 104 supra and accompanying text.
109. Stricklan v. KoeUa, 546 S.W.2d 810, 813 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1976).
110. See, e.g., Williams v. Bashman, 457 F. Supp. 322 (E.D. Pa. 1978); Freeman v. Rubin, 318
So. 2d 540 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975).
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the liability of even a clearly negligent attorney. But there is no reason
to believe that the idea will gain widespread acceptance."'
The causation argument for immunity developed in the context of
civil malpractice. Although no court has barred a criminal malpractice
claim on this basis, the causation defense can be readily asserted be-
cause many malpractice claims challenge the attorney's conduct at trial.
The peculiar nature of criminal malpractice actions, however, may lend
credibility to the finding of proximate cause. This extra credibility may
make the difference between immunity for negligence in the conduct of
civil litigation and liability for negligent criminal defense.
When a client brings a civil malpractice suit alleging that compe-
tent trial strategy by his attorney would have resulted in a more
favorable judgment, he alleges that a competent attorney would have
presented his case differently. For example, if the client was a defend-
ant in the underlying civil suit, he may contend that his attorney ne-
glected to raise a defense that any competent attorney would have
asserted. The client then presents that defense, and the jury in the mal-
practice action decides whether he has proved that the omission of that
defense constitutes negligence. If the client demonstrates negligence,
he must still show that, but for the omission, the jury in the underlying
case would have returned a more favorable verdict. The problem with
the causation inquiry is that the malpractice jury must guess what the
jury in the underlying case would have decided. 12 Most jurisdictions
permit this speculation in a civil malpractice case on the theory that the
negligently omitted defense, when presented to the malpractice jury,
will lead those jurors to the same conclusion that the jury in the under-
lying case would have reached. 13 Thus, if after hearing the omitted
111. As of January 1, 1981, only Tennessee recognized this form of immunity. Several com-
mentators, however, have discussed this argument. See commentators cited in note 103 supra.
112. See note 109 supra and accompanying text.
113. Stricklan v. Koella, 546 S.W.2d 810, 813 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1976). Some courts hold that
the malpractice jury should not guess what the prior jury would have done, but instead should try
the matter denovo. E.g., Fuschetti v. Bierman, 128 N.J. Super. 290, 297, 319 A.2d 781, 785 (1974);
see Note, The Use of Expert Testimony in Actions Against Litigation Attorneys, 14 WILLAMETrE
L.J 425, 436-37 (1978). In these jurisdictions the underlying case is retried for the malpractice
jury. If the jury finds for the criminal defendant, it is presumed that the underlying jury would
have reached the same conclusion, and the client has demonstrated causation. A trial de novo is a
more sensible procedure than asking one jury to guess how another jury would react.
If a jurisdiction allows a criminal malpractice case to be tried under this method, the mal-
practice plaintiff's burden of proof would be different. The criminal malpractice action is a civil
suit, but to prove that his attorney's negligence caused his criminal conviction, he would only have
to demonstrate a reasonable doubt of his guilt. The law would presume that, all juries being
equal, if the malpractice jury found a reasonable doubt of the client's guilt, then the underlying
criminal jury would have reacted identically, and acquitted the client. Civil and criminal forums
are inherently different, however, and these differences may undermine the validity of this pre-
sumption. See note 35 supra.
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defense the malpractice jury is persuaded by a preponderance of the
evidence that the client should have received a more favorable verdict,
it can conclude that the jury in the underlying case also would have
found for the client.
Jurisdictions that do not find this causal link too speculative
should allow a criminal malpractice plaintiff to demonstrate causation
in a similar manner: if the malpractice jury, having heard the client
present an allegedly proper criminal case, has a reasonable doubt of his
guilt, the law should assume that the jury in the criminal trial also
would have found reasonable doubt and acquitted.114 In jurisdictions
unwilling to make this assumption, a criminal malpractice plaintiff
should be permitted to attempt to establish a more conclusive causal
link. If the client, by presenting the defense omitted at the criminal
trial, can prove to the malpractice jury by a preponderance of the evi-
dence that he is innocent of the criminal charges,' 15 a presumption that
the criminal jury would have found at least a reasonable doubt of the
client's guilt should exist. The causal connection therefore would be
established.
Using this presumption the element of proximate cause can be es-
tablished more definitely in criminal malpractice cases than in civil
malpractice cases. In civil cases there is no margin of error; one jury
must be exactly like another. In criminal malpractice a margin of error
is provided; if one jury finds that a preponderance of the evidence indi-
cates innocence, another jury, even if it does not have identical reac-
tions, will in all likelihood find reasonable doubt of guilt.116
Courts should allow criminal malpractice plaintiffs to demonstrate
causation by satisfying the same burden of proof as in the underlying
criminal case. If this theory of causation seems speculative, a court
should not overreact by providing absolute immunity. Rather, it
should accept the more conclusive causal link provided by the margin-
of-error proposal. This system is imperfect; because the causation bur-
den in the malpractice case is higher than in the underlying criminal
case, many clients who would have been acquitted with adequate rep-
resentation will be unable to recover for the negligence of their attor-
114. See note 113 supra.
115. To simplify matters, this discussion concerns a criminal malpractice plaintiffwho alleges
that a competent defense would have resulted in a complete acquittal. The rationale is equally
applicable to situations in which the client would have been found guilty on a lesser charge.
116. Other solutions to the causation problem have been suggested for civil malpractice. See
Note, The Standard of Proof of Causation in Legal Malpractice Cases, 63 CORNELL L. REV. 666,




neys. Nevertheless, the margin-of-error proposal is fairer to the client
than a system of absolute immunity.
VI. CONCLUSION
A criminal malpractice plaintiff, like other tort victims, may at-
tempt to prove his case unless a substantial public policy reason justi-
fies a threshold barrier to recovery. A criminal malpractice plaintiff
should not face harsher threshold requirements than his civil counter-
part. A mail who is wrongfully imprisoned is no less deserving of resti-
tution than a man who has wrongly suffered a money judgment. A
concept such as the requirement of innocence suggests that the court is
focusing not on the alleged injury, but on whether the victim deserves
protection. Tort law is not concerned with the conduct of the victim in
that sense because the morality of the plaintiff is not an element of the
cause of action.
No reason exists to preclude a potentially valid criminal malprac-
tice claim as a threshold matter. Considering the rarity of such suits,
the extra expenditure of judicial resources will not unduly burden the
courts. Collateral estoppel and the different types of immunity are
valid concepts if exercised prudently, but neither is universally appro-
priate. Collateral estoppel should be applied to criminal malpractice
claims only after the particular facts of each case have been examined.
The concept of immunity should not bar otherwise valid claims unless
the equities are overwhelming. The rule of law is that liability follows
the tort, and immunity is only the exception.117 Such exceptions to
criminal malpractice recovery are unjustified.
David H. Potel
117. Reese v. Danforth, 486 Pa. 479, 487, 406 A.2d 735, 739 (1979).
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EDITOR'S NOTE
In North Haven Board of Education v. Hufstedler, 629 F.2d 773 (2d
Cir. 1980), cert. granted sub nom. North Haven Board of Education v.
Bell, 101 S. Ct. 1345 (1981), the Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit upheld the validity of Department of Health, Education, and
Welfare regulations prescribing certain employment practices of educa-
tional institutions receiving federal financial assistance. Decisions from
the Courts of Appeals for the First, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Ninth
Circuits support a contrary position: that the HEW regulations,
promulgated under the authority of Title IX of the Education Amend-
ments of 1972, exceed the scope of that statute.
The authors of the following two notes argue opposing sides of this
issue. The first author, relying primarily on an interpretation of the
legislative history of Title IX, contends that the HEW regulations are
invalid. The second author, agreeing with the North Haven court and
relying in part on statements made by the bilrs sponsor in the Senate
and in part on the remedial purposes behind Title IX, argues that the
regulations are within the authority of the HEW under the statute.
These notes illustrate that, pending Supreme Court resolution, this is-
sue is far from settled.
